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Linking Organization Structures 
and Processes to Business Strategy 
Douglas M. Cowherd and Robert H. Luchs 
There is currently a great need for the integration of organiza- 
tionaland strategic studies in order that one should support the 
other. This article describes the creation and development of a 
service designed as a data base to be used at the business unit 
level. Its objective is to provide a description of organizational 
variables, identify the effect of variables on strategy and 
provide a methodology consistent with objectives. 
Background 
Strategic Management has been defined as the 
process of general managers co-aligning their 
organizations to environmental opportunities and 
constraints.] Although much has been written in 
recent years about the desirability of creating a fit 
between organization and business strategy,’ this 
work remains largely theoretical3 or descriptive;’ 
empirical work in this area is rare. Instead two 
separate streams have emerged:’ 
a 
* 
Strategic studies which focus on competitive 
analysis, and market environment and other 
external concerns.’ 
Organizational studies which cmphasizc internal 
concerns such as organizational design, human 
resource systems and culture.’ 
There is a crying need to integrate the two streams 
of thought. Every day we read post-mortems in the 
business press that place the blame for failed strategy 
on organizational factors. Very few firms have 
achieved ‘Strategic Management’ which tailors an 
organization to support a business strategy. 
No doubt the lack of sound theory is in part 
responsible for this sorry state of affairs. With little 
evidence to rely on, the discussion of how to support 
strategy with organization often degenerates to the 
exchange of anecdotes and the invocation of the 
latest management best-seller. 
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Creation of the OASIS Program 
In response to this need to understand how to 
organize to implement business strategies, OASIS 
(Organization and Strategy Information Service) 
was launched in 1984 as a joint vcnturc of Hay 
Management Consultants, The Strategic Planning 
Institute, and the University of Michigan. OASIS is 
designed to be a longitudinal data base consisting of 
environmental, strategic, organizational and perfor- 
mance data at the business unit level. The objcctivcs 
of this effort are: 
To provide a comprehensive quantitative dcs- 
cription of organizational variables. 
To identify the effect of organizational variables 
on strategic success. 
To provide an empirical methodology which 
can quickly and comprehensively check an 
organization for consistency with business objec- 
tives. 
The first stage of the research is now complctc. 
Although the research is based on only 60 business 
units, and therefore not yet suitable for elaborate 
multivariatc research, some of the more basic 
hypothcscs regarding the relationship bctwccn 
strategy, organization and pcrformancc can be 
tested. This has yielded interesting results, promis- 
ing more insight when the data base expands 
permitting more elaborate research. 
Relevance of the PIMS Program 
The research approach and the structure of the data 
base is heavily influenced by the Strategic Planning 
Institute’s PIMS Program, so it is appropriate to 
briefly review that program.n 
The PIMS Program is probably the most extensive 
ongoing empirical research effort in the arca of 
strategic planning. Its unique data base contains at 
least 4 years of detailed operating, environmental 
and competitive data on more than 3000 business 
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units. Thcsc businesses cover a broad range of 
industries and markets, primarily in North America 
and Europe. Research on these data has revealed that 
there are indeed ‘regularities’ in how competitive 
and environmental factors affect the behaviour and 
performance of a business unit.’ In practice, com- 
panies participating in the PIMS Program regularly 
access the data base and the models which derive 
from it as an aid to their strategic planning. 
While the PIMS research efforts have explained a 
large proportion of the variation in return on 
investment, this research has not provided a com- 
plete explanation of business unit performance. By 
combining strategic and organizational variables in 
one research model, OASIS has the potential to 
elaborate on the fundamental findings of the PIMS 
Program. 
The PAR ROI model, for example, calculates the 
expected or ‘normal’ profitability for a business unit 
based on approximately 30 of its structural and 
strategic characteristics. Although the PIMS 
research underlying this model shows that over time 
business units tend to approach their ‘PAR’ or 
expected ROI, at any given time a business may 
have a deviation from this expected ROI. Indeed, 
uncovering such deviations is a major benefit of the 
model, since PIMS research reveals that incremental 
investment will generate returns that are more 
closely related to PAR than actual ROI. In the case 
of a negative deviation, the key issue is how 
expected ROI can be attained. When a positive 
deviation is in evidence, a critical question is how to 
sustain this above-avcragc performance. While 
other PIMS tools can provide some explanations for 
these deviations (c.g. poor price realization or high 
marketing and ovcrhcad costs), these explanations 
can pcrforcc only refer to the cnvironmcntal and 
strategic variables in the data base. Howcvcr, 
experience suggests that the underlying causes arc 
often in the organizational domain. For example, 
high lcvcls of marketing cxpcnditurc with littlc 
benefit may well be due, in part, to an organiza- 
tional structure with too many levels, a lack of a 
marketing-oriented culture, poor compensation 
schemes for the sales force or their lack of training in 
selling the bcncfits of a superior product. Rcscarch 
conducted by Hammermcsh and White on business 
autonomy underscores the value of expanding the 
PIMS framework in this manner.“’ 
The Methodology 
research on organization can 
different levels analysis from work 
teams strategic groups firms. The 
collect data the business level for number of 
The primary for this of level 
analysis is need for quantifiable measure 
performance that widely applicable many 
different of enterprises. such measure, 
on investment, an organizational 
that has both over income side 
the equation the investment generates this 
Within this the greatest 
disaggregation of is desirable, this allows 
modelling of strategic situations 
than the of many positions. The 
of organization, also rcquircs 
intact systems people who around the 
of a set of assets. This criterion 
often requires a larger unit of analysis than one 
which might best fit the other two. So, the overlap 
which best fits all three criteria is the unit of analysis, 
a business unit which frequently is the same as that 
which is the focus of previous PIMS research. 
The research team collected data on seven domains 
that characterize the business unit as shown in 
Figure 1. Data are collected from key informants 
within the business unit for each of the components 
in the model. In addition, the business unit’s top 
management culture is assessed through an anony- 
mous survey of this group. 
The rcscarch described below is based on data from 
58 North American business units from a variety of 
industries. While this sample is much smaller than 
the PIMS data base, it is suficicntly large to test the 
basic hypothesis. Moreover, by utilizing the PIMS 
PAR ROI model as a performance measure, 
OASIS is able to build on the results of research on a 
3000 business unit data base. 
The technique used in this research is to search for 
the relationship between various organizational 
factors and the performance mcasurc deviation 
from expected ROI. The deviation from cxpcctcd 
ROI is the diffcrcncc bctwccn the ROI predicted by 
the PIMS PAR ROI model (the cxpcctcd ROI) and 
actual performance. Thus, the deviation is the 
component of business unit performance that is not 
explained by the environmental and strategic factors 
included in the PIMS model, but is potentially 
understood through a relationship with the organiz- 
ational components of the integrated model (note: 
in this sample there was a systematic f&-point 
positive deviation from PAR ROI). 
While the research cannot bc considered conclusive 
due to the size of the sample, a highly significant 
relationship between organizational factors and 
deviation from expected ROI is evident. This 
strongly argues that such factors must and can be 
taken into consideration when one either attempts 
to theoretically understand or pragmatically 
manage a business unit. 
Research Results 
Research on the data base has uncovered significant 
findings in each of the four organizational domains 
of the model. Research findings exemplifying each 
domain will now be examined. 

































Figure 1. The research model 
Organizational Design 
The data relating to organizational design have 
yielded interesting results on both the issues of 
business unit size as well as lcvcls of organizational 
structure. 
The advocates of ‘small is beautiful’ and industrial 
economists who stress ‘scale economics’ will bc 
surprised that the research indicates that m&unl-size 
business units are the most profitable (set Figure 2).* 
This finding suggests that there is an optimal mix of 
the scale economics enjoyed by many larger 
businesses and the less bureaucratic organizational 
culture of smaller businesses. 
Another key issue vexing business managers is the 
number of structural levels a business unit should 
*In Figures 2 and 54 the vertical axis is usually the deviation from 
expected ROI calculated on the basis of the environmental and 
competitive data collected on each business; the horizontal axis is the 
variable under examination. Averages are shown and all results are 
significant at the 0.05 level or above. 
have. The data indicate that the number of structural 
lcvcls is highly correlated with the dcgrcc of a 
business unit’s through-put. Figure 3 shows the 
correlation between the number of lcvcls and total 
operating expenditures. This provides a guide to 
what is typical in terms ofreporting relationships for 
the operations function of a business unit. 
The key issue is the affect on business unit 
performance when business units arc above or 
below their expected number of levels. The research 
shows that the current bias towards ‘lean and mean’ 
structures depends on the business units through-put 
(see Figure 4).t 
In business units with great operations through- 
put-those in which the expected number of 
organizational levels is high-it is prefcrablc to have 
fewer levels than is typical. Howcvcr, in smaller 
tNote: Although results presented here are in terms of actual ROI for 
simplicity of presentation, results are the same when deviation from 
expected ROI is used as the measure of performance. 
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Figure 4. Profit impact of shortfall or excess 
number of levels in operations 
organizations the highest level of profitability \vas 
achicvcd by business units which wcrc more hcavil) 
laycrcd than the norm. 
One explanation for this rather surprising finding 
may be that in smaller organizations thcrc is usual11 
less political use of organizational lcvcls. Larger 
organizations tend to bc older, so thcrc has been 
more time for positions to have been created in 
order to ‘kick somconc upstairs’ for political 
purposes. In addition, the grcatcr complexity of 
larger organizations creates more opportunity to 
hide these qucstionablc structural accretions. In 
smaller organizations such practices arc more 
obvious, and so less prcvalcnt. Marc commonly, 
smaller organizations have another problem : csccs- 
sive span of control occurs as pcoplc arc added 
during growth but restructuring the organization 
lags behind. An ‘excess’ layer or two under these 
circumstances appears to solve more problems than 
arc created. 
The data collected in this arca included comprchcn- 
sive information about both the lcvcls and composi- 
tion ofmanagers’ compensation. In the pilot sample, 
for cxamplc, on avcragc top managers rcccivcd 
30 per cent of their total compensation in the form 
of incentive compensation. At the second lcvcl the 
avcragc was 20 per cent and at the third, 10 per cent. 
As in the cast of the number of organizational lcvcls 
in a business unit, howcvcr, the key issue is not thcsc 
dcscriptivc data ycr SC but when or if it pays to 
dcviatc from thcsc ‘normal lcvcls. Hcrc too the 
initial rcscarch yields sonic intcrcsting results. 
Business units generating grcatcr-than-cxpcctcd 
profits arc characterized by having a high level of 
inccntivc pay in the top managers’ total compcnsa- 
tion package. Intcrcstingly, while inccntivc com- 
pcnsation is more prevalent in mature markets, the 
rcscarch indicates that the biggest impact is prcciscly 
where it is used least-at the beginning and the end 
of the product lift cycle (SW Figure 5). 
The impact of inccntivc compensation at the second 
lcvcl (Figure 6), also shows that the impact of 
inccntivc compensation differs by the product lift 
cycle stage. A high lcvcl of inccntivc pay leads to the 
most substantial bcncfits in the dcclinc stage at this 
managcmcnt Icvcl, whcrc such inccntivcs may well 
bc necessary to retain and motivate skilled 
managers. 
Management Characteristics 
There has been a great incrcasc in the flow of 
corporate cxccutivcs bctwccn companies in North 
America, as attcstcd by the booming rcvcnucs of 
cxecutivc search firms. At the same time, many 
businesses arc fighting this trend. They arc trying to 
establish succession systems that will dccrcasc the 
need to go outside the organization for managcmcnt 
talent in order to minimize disruption and bccausc 
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internal development is considcrcd inherently desir- 
able. 
The research indicates that the key to the insider 
versus outsider question is undc>rstanding the impact 
of the business unit’s position in the product life 
cycle. Businesses in the growth stage arc more 
profitable when they draw at least 20 per cent of 
their managers in the top three lc\~cls from outside 
of the business unit. The new ideas and \villingncss 
to consider alternatives to the status quo that can bc 
generated by a higher mix of outsiders arc highl) 
adaptive in a turbulent market. For different reasons 
it is also advantageous to have more outsiders in a 
declining product life cycle stage. Insiders have a 
tendency to fail to recognize the onset of decline, 
and persevere in old strategies and practices that may 
no longer be effective. Newcomers may be more 
likely to move away from doing business as usual in 
a declining market. Also, the personnel reductions 
and cost cutting that arc usually required in this 
stage of the product life cycle arc more difficult for 
entrenched insiders who have commitments to the 
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Figure 7. Impact of business unit outsiders 
depends on product life cycle stage 
Only in the mature stage of the product life cycle is 
it optimal to have less than 20 per cent outsiders. In 
this stage there is less change in technology, 
customer needs, and competitor strategy. So busl- 
ness units with high proportions of insiders gain the 
advantage of greater business-specific knowledge, 
while having less need for the innovation that 
outsiders tend to provide (see Figure 7). 
Organizational Culture 
While organizational culture has had the dubious 
distinction of being the hot trend of the l%Os, 
evidence for the connection between culture and 
business pcrformancc has largely consisted of ancc- 
dotes and small group studies. The data base 
provides an empirical link between survey measures 
of the cultural perceptions of pcoplc in the top three 
lcvcls of management to business unit pcrformancc. 
Thcrc is a substantial association bctwccn business 
unit culture and performance on a number of 
cultural dimensions. The culture factors range from 
those that arc somctimcs considered irrclcvant to 
business performance (e.g. participative style), to 
those that arc more obviously linked to business 
operations (e.g. adapts to environment). Culture has 
an cffcct in both small and large business. 
In the survey data, managers wcrc asked not only to 
indicate whcthcr a given descriptor characterized 
the prcscnt situation, but also to indicate whcthcr or 
not it should. Data collected in this fashion made 
possible, among other things, an examination of 
how a ‘culture gap’ affects performance, i.e. what 
occurs if current practices do not mesh with those 
dcsircd by the business unit’s management. Such a 
‘culture gap’ dots indeed have a substantial impact 
on business unit profitability: when the practices of 
the top management coincide with those desired by 
their subordinates, pcrformancc above expectation 
is to be observed (see Figure 8). 
OASIS in Practice: A Case Example 
While the fundamental purpose of OASIS is to 
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determine the relationship between strategy, 
organization, and performance, the program also 
provides a tool for practical application. Initial 
experiences in utilizing OASIS to integrate strategic 
and organizational analyses in a variety of business 
units have shown it to be quite useful. The disguised 
case study described bclo\v demonstrates how the 
model can be applied in practice. 
Carling Tools is a highly profitable producer of 
consumer power tools in North America, com- 
manding a strong number 2 position in the market. 
Despite this strength, there are signs of trouble. 
Share is drifting down\vardc and competitors have 
been more nimble in introducing new products and 
special features for existing products. 
The management of Carling Tools decided to 
participate in OASIS because they hoped it would 
help them find answers to these critical questions: 
* Is the basic business secure? 
A If not, what needs to be done strategically and 
tactically? 
?r What organizational changes should be under- 
taken to support the business strategy? 
The OASIS analysis examined the overall strategic 
position of the business, basing its findings on PIMS 
research results. This analysis highlighted several 
important facts. 
The strategic position of the business was quite 
strong, with a high expected ROI of 35 per cent. 
The current performance of the business actually 
exceeded this strong expectation (actual ROI: 
46 per cent). This overperformancc, however, did 
not appear to be due to tight operations (e.g. good 
control of administrative overheads), but rather 
because Carling was still leveraging its long history 
of superior design to maintain premium prices. 
However, recently Carling had fallen behind its 
major competitors in terms of innovation and 
marketing support. An examination of similarly 
structured businesses in the PIMS data base revealed 
that failure to address this situation would result in 
the further loss of share and profit margins. 
However, a number of similar businesses had 
successfully overcome these weaknesses and even 
managed to increase share while maintaining mar- 
gins. The key to their success lay in closing the 
innovation gap and more effective marketing, both 
at the trade and consumer level. 
This strategic diagnosis set the stage for a review of 
organizational factors. This process provided con- 
siderable guidance on the steps Carling needed to 
take to implement a strategy or renewed innovation 
and marketing vigour. 
For example, a comparison with OASIS bench- 
marks for structural levels showed excess layers of 
management, particularly in marketing, which 
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Figure 9. The Carling Tools case-comparison 
with OASIS benchmarks 
would help explain Carling’s comparatively slug- 
gish reaction time (see Figure 9). 
Furthermore, the business unit itself was too large 
(10,000 employees) for quick response in the 
market-place. Shielded from direct contact with the 
market by the over-layered bureaucracy, top 
managers spent most of their time in financial and 
administrative activities while devoting little effort 
to sales and marketing. 
The culture of Carling Tools was also a primary 
contributor to their problems. The OASIS culture 
survey disclosed an atmosphere which is normally 
associated with marketing problems: little freedom 
for independent action; a highly formal environ- 
ment and little openness to change. 
While the review of Carling Tools’ organization 
found a number of strengths, it also indicated that a 
major change in organization would be required to 
successfully implement a strategy designed to 
reverse the recent declines in market share. A 
number of specific actions were suggested from the 
study : 
The business should be divided into several 
smaller, more manageable units that arc more 
responsive to the needs of existing and emerging 
customer segments. 
Middle management layers should be removed, 
increasing senior managers’ contact with cus- 
tomcrs. 
Managers from outside Carling Tools should be 
recruited into the top levels of the business. 
Incentive compensation should be incrcascd and 
redesigned to reward growth. 
The General Manager of Carling Tools should 
initiate a culture change process designed to 
increase the level of autonomy, informality, and 
information flow in the top management group. 
Top management took a surprisingly positive view 
of these recommendations, although they dealt with 
well-established practices in the business. The 
consultants involved in the cast bclicvcd that this 
willingness to change the status quo was due to the 
link bctwccn the strategic and organizational ana- 
lyses, and because the empirical support for the 
recommendation enhanced their credibility. 
The Next Stage qf OASIS 
The initial research results indicate that there are 
strong relationships between business strategy. 
organization and performance. As the data base 
expands, further research designed to explore more 
complex questions will be conducted. In recent 
months a number of companies in Europe have 
participated in the program. This provides an 
opportunity to test the initial findings, which were 
based on data from North American businesses, and 
to determine the area in which European patterns 
are different. 
We are developing a systematic approach to 
integrating strategy, organization, and pcrfor- 
mance. While the data base is not large enough to 
test the complex interrelationships that managers 
must ultimately master to achieve a sustained 
competitive advantage, the findings arc proving to 
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